Materials ENCORE Summer School by Vivek Ghosal

Most articles are available online.

Click on links below (in blue).

 

Information on the cases will be handed out during the course days. 

 

---

 

Day One: Thursday 31 August

 

Part I: 9.00 - 10.30 hrs.

Evolution of Antitrust

 

• Brief introduction to U.S. history: law, economics, enforcement.
• Paper: Bork, Robert. “The Goals of Antitrust Policy,” American Economic Review 57, 1967, 242-53.
• Paper: Baker, Jonathan. “A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust,” in Roger van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi and Antonio Cucinotta (eds.), Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Analysis, Edward Elgar, 2002.
• Williamson, Oliver. “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” American Economic Review 58, 1968, 18-36.
• EU overview: Motta Massimo. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2004, Chapter 1.
• Harrington, Joseph E. “Antitrust Enforcement,” in The New Palgrave: Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition.), L. Blume and S. Durlauf (Eds.). Macmillan Press, forthcoming.
• Case: Kinney Company, Inc. and Brown Shoe Company, Inc. (U.S. v. Brown Shoe Co., 1962.). [This provides a look at the old U.S. way of looking at market power issues under the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.]
• Case: Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania (U.S., 1977). [This is the first case where the courts explicitly considered efficiencies of business practices.]

Part II: 11.00 - 12.30 hrs.

Political-Economy Issues

• Paper: Peltzman, Sam. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics 19, 1976, 211-40.
• Paper: Faure-Grimaud, Antoine and David Martimort. “Regulatory Inertia,” RAND Journal of Economics 34, 2003, 413-437.
• Paper: Ghosal, Vivek."Regime Shift in Antitrust, " Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006.

Part III: 14.00 - 15.30 hrs.

Merger Control in the U.S.

• Paper: Kolasky, William and Andrew Dick. “The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers,” Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine, 2002.
• Paper: Werden, Gregory. “The 1982 Merger Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm,” Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine, 2002.
• Paper: Williamson, Oliver. “The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice—In Perspective,” Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust Doctrine, 2002.
• Case: Staples and Office Depot. (Case: U.S. FTC v. Staples Inc, 1997).
• Case: United Electric Coal Companies and Material Service Corp. (predecessor of General Dynamics Corp.). (Case: U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 1974.)
• Case: American Electric Power Co. and Central and Southwest Co. (2000).
• Case: IBM’s acquisition of Informix (2001).

Part IV: 16.00 - 17.30 hrs.

Merger control in EU

• Case: Aerospatiale / Alenia / De Havilland (1991)
• Case: Volvo and Scania (2000)

• Paper: Duso, Tomaso, Klaus Gugler and Burcin Yurtoglu. “EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment,” in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, (forthcoming) 2006.
• Paper: Ivaldi, Marc and Frank Verboven. “Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, 2005, 669– 691.

19:00- Dinner at Restaurant Plancius

 

 

Day Two: Friday 1 September

 

Part V: 9.00 - 10.30 hrs.

Some mergers evaluated by both US and EU

• Case: Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (1997)
• Case: Worldcom and Sprint (1999)
• Case: General Electric and Honeywell (2000)

• Paper: Choi, Jay Pil. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger,” in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, (forthcoming) 2006.
• Paper: Monti, Mario. “Prospects for Transatlantic Competition Policy,” Institute for International Economics, (May) 2001.
• Paper: Baker, Jonathan. “My Summer Vacation at the European Commission,” The Antitrust Source, (September) 2005.

 

Part VI : 11.00 - 12.30 hrs.

Cartels

• Brief history of enforcement, U.S.  and EU enforcement
• Paper: Schinkel, M.P., M. Carree and A.M. Günster, “European Antitrust Policy: An Analysis of Commission Decisions, 1962-2004,” Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics Working Paper Series, 2006.
• Paper: Connor, John. “Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels,” in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, (forthcoming) 2006.
• Paper: Ivaldi, Marc, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole. “The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control,” in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds). Amsterdam: North-Holland, (forthcoming) 2006.

 

Part VII : 14.00 - 15.30 hrs.

Cartels

 

• Issues in detection. Brief history of various US and EU information revelation mechanisms.
• Paper: Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M., Luke Froeb, John Geweke and Christopher Taylor, “A Variance Screen for Collusion,” FTC Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 275, March 2005.
• Porter, Rob. “Detecting Collusion,” Keynote lecture delivered at the International Industrial Organization Conference, Chicago, 2004.
• Paper: Ghosal, Vivek. “Uncovering Dynamic Interrelationships in the Process of Criminal Antitrust Investigations,” Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006.

 

Part VIII: 16.00 - 17.30 hrs.

Concluding Remarks and Discussion

 

17:30 Drinks in "the Burcht"